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Abstract: This article solves and characterizes optimal decision rules to invest in irreversible 
land improvements conditional on land tenure insecurity. Economic model is a normative 
dynamic programming model with known parameters for the one period returns and transition 
equations. The optimal decision rules for liming are solved numerically, conditional on 
alternative scenarios on the likelihood that the lease contract and, thus, farmer access to land is 
either renewed or expired. The model parameters represent Finnish soil quality and production 
conditions. The results suggest that irreversible liming decreases quickly and the yields decline 
gradually, when the farmer is confronted with land tenure insecurity caused by uncertain 
renewal of the lease contract. The results are confirmed via empirical results. 
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 1 INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Economic literature analysing implications of land tenure insecurity focuses for the most part in 
developing countries. In these countries land tenure insecurity has large implications, not only 
on land improvements, but also on the household and society welfare as a whole. In many 
empirical studies the effects of land tenure insecurity could not, however, be strongly identified 
in these countries, because household access to farming inputs and output markets can be 
severely retarded by other institutional, financial, and economic factors than by land tenure 
insecurity alone (Holden and Hailu 2002).  
 
Even if land tenure insecurity is not yet a dominating problem in rich countries it may 
become such, particularly in Less Favoured Areas (LFA), where production costs are high and 
yields are low. The trend towards more liberalized food market and internationally harmonized 
agricultural policies decrease Marginal Value Products (MVP) for agricultural inputs in the LFA 
areas, where farmer options to adjust to these trends are rare. There are good reasons to expect 
that in the LFA areas of Northern Europe land improvements may decrease below the socially 
optimal levels
2, if farmers are confronted with significant land tenure insecurity.  
 
In Finland, for example, signals on market failures, caused by land tenure insecurity, are 
emerging. Liming has generally decreased, and it has decreased most in land parcels that have 
been cultivated under lease contracts (Kalkitusyhdistys 7.12.2004; Myyrä et al. 2003). The 
potential land tenure insecurity problem on leased land is becoming more and more extensive. In 
1994 the share of land cultivated under a lease contract from the total land area in Finland was 
18%. In 2004 the corresponding share was increased to 33% (Figure 1). The standard land lease 
contract in Finland is a short term contract with fixed duration and a fixed cash lease payment 
per year. They are typically made for 5 or 10 years. The average duration of lease contract is 6 



















Figure 1. Lime application tonnes/ha and the proportion of arable land under lease farming in 
Finland during years 1994 – 2004 (Kalkitusyhdistys 7.12.2004; Yearbook of Farm 
Statistics 2003). Data for year 2004 is preliminary.  
 
The goal of this paper is to describe the optimal liming applications on leased land under the 
Finnish production conditions, leasing institution and the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). 
This is important, because liming represents a relatively long term land improvement that is 
  1necessary to maintain land fertility and productivity of farming inputs. The soils of Finland 
have been formed from acidic rock and pH values in agricultural soils are commonly below 
the recommended level. Therefore, liming is one of the basic ameliorative measures used to 
maintain good yields. We focus on dynamic programming model described in section 2.  
 
The discrepancy between the soil pH values of leased and farmer-owned land is tested 
for in observed data.   
 
  
2 THE MODEL 
 
 
We solve and characterize optimal decision rules to invest in liming conditional on land tenure 
insecurity. Economic model is a normative Dynamic Programming (DP) model with known 
parameters for the one period returns and transition equations. The decision rules are solved 
numerically conditional on alternative scenarios on the likelihood that the lease contract and, 
thus, farmer access to land is expired. The model parameters represent Finnish conditions and 
they are based on extensive number of field experiments.  
 
 
2.1 The Bellman equation 
 
 
The grain grower optimization problem is modelled as a recursive finite horizon (T) dynamic 
programming problem that is solved numerically by iterating on the following Bellman’s 
equation (Bellman 1957): 
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where the optimal value function (Vt) is the function of the current state vector (zt); ut is the 
control, i.e. the lime application (often also called as the decision rule or policy function);  
Rt(.) is the one period net return function; β is the discount factor; and  Et[.] is the conditional 
expectations operator, conditioned on current information (Ωt). The optimal value function is 
constrained by the transition equations, in which g(.) is a function. It determines the 
connection between the current state and control and the next period state. In practice this 
means how pH is changing between years when the lime is added on the field or the 
cultivation is continued without adding lime on the field. The optimal solution is pinned down 
by the initial state z0. It has to be noticed that zt  and ut have separate contributions to the net 
return, even if ut has no direct effect on yield. This specification generalizes the models 
presented by Kennedy (1986).  
 
The problem is normalized to one hectare and the crop grown is spring barley which 
is the most common cereal grown in Finland. The soil types are fine-textured Vertic 
Cryaquept
3 and medium-textured Oxyaquic Eutrocryepts
3. The model represents land that has 
sufficient quality and the long run equilibrium is to keep soil pH status at satisfactory
4 levels 
from the society perspective, i.e. without land tenure insecurity. In more marginal land areas, 
the land tenure insecurity problem is not the only institutional factor that is decreasing the 
irreversible soil improvements in a high cost country with sparse rural population, such as 
Finland. The time horizon was set at 100 years which guaranteed that not only the decision 
  2rules but also the stock variables converged. This is important to see the equilibrium pH levels 
conditional on different contract regimes. 
   
Economic implications of land tenure insecurity are modelled through a sequence of 
fixed duration (τ) land leasing contracts. We simulate a five (τ=5) and ten (τ=10) year cash 
lease contracts, which are the standard durations for the lease contracts in Finland. Longer 
than 10 year contracts are forbidden by law (Maanvuokralaki). 
 
The signed contract continues, and farmer has access to land, by certainty until the 
contract’s next expiration date (in five years contracts: t=nτ, for n=1,2,3,…,20 and in ten 
years contracts: t=nτ, for n=1,2,3,…,10). At each expiration date t=nτ, the continuation of the 
contract is uncertain and it is renewed by an exogenously
5 given probability Probnτ. Because 
continuation and expiration are mutually exclusive, the probability that the lease contract 
expires is (1-Probnτ) and, once the contract expires, the one period returns are assumed to stay 
at zero forever. Thus, the expiration is assumed irreversible so that, if the contract expires, it 
can never be renewed. Under these conditions, taking the expectations results in the Bellman 
equation  
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  where  0≤Probt ≤1 for all t=nτ, and Probt=1 otherwise. 
 
The state vector (zt) includes the measure of soil acidity (pH) and prices of outputs (pt) 
and the price of the control variable (wt). Prices are assumed deterministic such that the 
current prices prevail in the future. Thus, the transition equations for prices are simply  
 
(3)   w w w and p p p t t t t = = = = + + 1 1  
 
The transition equation (i.e. the carry-over effect) for soil pH is defined separately in 
subsequent section.  
 
The one period net return (Rt) is the difference between the one period revenue from 
selling the yield minus the expenditure of purchasing the control (liming). Because other 
factors are hold fixed in the analysis, they can be suppressed and the one period return 
function is: 
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where y(pHt,ut) is a deterministic yield response function, specified below. The last term, wtut 
is the expenditure of using input i.e. lime. 
 
 
2.2 Lime (L): yield response and carry-over 
 
 
The liming control (u
l) is measured as tonnes per hectare (t/ha) and the stock of lime is 
measured in terms of soil pH. Liming has only an indirect effect on yield via soil pH.  The 
yield response to the soil pH is described by Mitscherlich function, because it fits best to the 
data in Kemppainen et al. 1993. It also has some desirable features in the context of liming, 
like convergence on maximum and no diminishing phase
6. The average yields of barley in 
years 2000-2004 in Finland were between 3,550 kg/ha and 3,210 kg/ha (Yearbook of Farm 
  3Statistics 2003). Our estimated maximum 3,748 is on line with the average annual yields 
reported in the statistics.  The yield function is: 
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The transition equation describing the carry-over-effect and the effects of liming to the soil 
pH is (Kemppainen et al. 1993) 
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With no liming, the average annual decay rate in the soil pH is 0.015 pH-points, which 
implies that annual amount of liming required for maintaining the existing pH level is in 
average 0.31 tonnes per hectare. With more demanding crops, more lime is needed to keep pH 
constant over time. The initial state is imposed at  8 . 5 0 = pH , which was estimated to be an 
average on leased plots in central and northern parts of Finland (Myyrä et al. 2003). The 
prices and the scope of the model are summarized in Table 1.  
 
 
TABLE 1. Prices and the scope of the optimization problem.  
Price of barley 
a
Price of lime 
a
   if applied 1-3 tonnes/ha 
   if applied 4-15 tonnes/ha 
Discount factor (β) 
Time horizon (T) 







5 or 10 years 
a The prices are at farm gate. The price of liming includes also distribution on the field 
because the standard is that the distribution is bough from a contractor and, therefore does not 







Liming is to some extent lumpy so that it is expensive to distribute small amounts of lime (see 
the price thresholds in Table 1). Therefore, if the initial soil pH is in biological target range, 
which is in our simulations 5.8, the land tenure insecurity does not make a difference in the 
optimal liming rules (Figure 1). It does not pay to distribute lime on land with pH level 
exceeding 5.5, except when the farmer access to land certainly continues, either through 
repeated contract renewals or land ownership. We have analysed crop farming and more 
precisely spring barley. More demanding crops would likely benefit from higher pH values.  
 
Substantially high observed pH values (initial state) on leased plots can be explained 
by short history of leasing and the domestic price support regime before Finland entry in the 
EU. If we use a pre-entry price for barley (in year 1994), the socially optimal pH level will 
converge near to biological optimum. Also the reputation condition mentioned by Sjaastad 
and Bromley (1997) might be one explanation. 
       
But when the initial pH level decreases, which is inevitable according our results, 
decisions to lime diversify according to the length of lease contract and uncertainty over 
continuation of the lease contract (Figures 2 and 3). If the contract is going to expire by 
certainty, it pays to lime at the beginning of a ten (five) year contract only if the soil pH is 
  4below an extremely low value of 5.2 (5.1).  If the odds are slightly in favour of contract 
renewal (Probability of expire = 25% ) it pays to lime at the beginning of the ten (five) year 
contract if the soil pH is below 5.4 (5.3). Results show, that if the probability of expiration of 
contract is small, the date of liming is not important, but when the probability of expiration of 
contract is big, the only reasonable date for liming is the first year of contract.  This is one 
disadvantage of short term contract which are competed by tenant continuously. Especially, 
when contract is short and likelihood for contract renewal decreases and the odds are in 
favour of contract termination, the soil pH is allowed to decrease below 5.25, which in the 
soil studies most commonly represents the fertility class “rather poor”
4. This is below the 
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Figure 2. Development of soil pH in a sequence of ten year lease contracts conditional on 
alternative contract renewal probabilities. The upward sloping jumps in soil pH indicate 
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Figure 3. Development of soil pH in a sequence of five year lease contracts conditional on 
alternative contract renewal probabilities. The upward sloping jumps in soil pH indicate 




Neglected liming implies a gradual decrease in soil pH, which will eventually decrease 
yields (ceteris paribus). Figure 4 traces out patterns of consequent ten and five year contracts, 
which sum up to a 100 year period (only the first 70 years are drawn because the end of 
planning period is affecting to results on years 70-100). When the land has been cultivated 
under several subsequent lease contracts and the likelihood for contract renewal has been 
repeatedly at stake, the yield will start to decrease significantly and converge to around 3,600 
kg/ha on ten years contracts and around 3,450 on five years contracts. The yield decrease 
from the 3,750 kg/ha steady state equilibrium without land tenure insecurity is 150-300 kg/ha 
and in relative terms 4-8 per cent. If the odds are slightly in favour of contract renewal 
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Figure 4. Predicted yield response to optimal liming under alternative probabilities for a 
expiration of each ten and five year lease contracts (ceteris paribus).  
 
In our positive approaches
7, the insecurity problem has had statistically significant 
effects on the soil pH. The mean soil pH was estimated to be 0.2 pH units higher in the land 
owned by the farmer than in the land cultivated under a lease contract. In different parts and 
soil types in Finland, the mean soil pH for the owned parcels was higher than that of the 
leased parcels. However, the endpoints of the 95% confidence intervals for the mean implied 
that the true means of both land tenure status can be within the satisfactory class. The 
Continuity  Probability to expire is 25% 
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  7measured mean soil pH values where substantially high, 6.0 in owner operated and 5.8 in 
tenant operated fields in central and northern parts of Finland. 
  
There are a slight difference between the observed pH values and the predicted pH 
values, as predicted by the normative model. Nevertheless, the model predicts the discrepancy 
of pH values between the owner and tenant operated plots as it is also observed in the data. 
When we know that average duration of the lease contracts in Finland is six years, the result 
give signals that the average probability of renewing a lease contract with the same tenant is 
50%. This conclusion can be made, even if we knew that the difference in observed pH values 




4. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
 
The results of our normative dynamic programming model, solved with known parameters, 
highlight that the optimal decision rules on irreversible land improvements, with long pay-
back periods, substantially diversify according to the extent of land tenure insecurity. Liming 
decreases below the optimum for the society, when the likelihood for contract renewal 
decreases and likelihood of having future access to land decreases. Therefore, the current 
tendency of gradually increasing share of land cultivated under short duration cash lease 
contracts poses a problem in maintaining land improvements that are sufficient for 
maximizing society welfare. This will finally turn into decreased yields and weakened supply 
for food. Further, the incentive problem caused by land tenure insecurity will hamper the 
efficiency of environmental programs to decrease nutrient runoffs since the standard is that 
implementing these programs requires irreversible investments on land with long payback 
periods.  
 
The substantial implications, as suggested by our normative model, are supported by 
aggregate market behaviour. The demand for lime has been decreasing rapidly as the share of 
land cultivated under lease contracts has been increasing. It has to be noted, however, that the 
market trends have been affected also by other institutional and economic factors, such as 
decreasing Marginal Value Product for lime in 1995, when Finland joined EU.  
  
Our results hold only to cash lease contracts where the likelihood of contract renewal is 
exogenous. The results do not generalize to repeated dynamic games, in which the reputation 
effect has significant implications to the optimal decision rules. Thus, our analysis does not 
account for the possibility that land improvements may be used to increase likelihood for 
contract renewal. 
 
One of the main goals of CAP is to increase productivity in agriculture. The results 
signal that reaching this goal may be seriously hampered by gradually increasing land leasing 
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  2. The socially optimal level of land improvements refers to a level, wich is reached 
in competitive markets equilibrium without land tenure insecurity (Mas-Coell et.al. 1995 p. 
325-328). The social optimum gives the maximum welfare for society as a whole, including 
land onwners and tenants. 
 
  3. Soil taxonomy. 
 
  4. The class limits depend on the particle size distribution and the organic matter 
content of the soil.       
  
  5. This is a simplification of true life. In case of short duration fixed cash lease 
contracts which are common in Finland the reputation (performance and used farming 
practices like liming in earlier periods) of tenant might be crucial variable when land owner 
decides the next period’s tenant. Unfortunately we don’t have any empirical data on 
reputation effect to continuation of lease contract in case of developed countries like Finland. 
It has been shown that in some circumstances tenant might have incentives above to land 
owner to invest in land (Sjaastad and Bromley 1997). One important notice in our case is that 
tenant is not compensated of his efforts for land improvements (like liming) on expiration 
date if contract is not renewed.  
 
  9  6. In case of fertilization the lack of the diminishing phase is a disadvantage 
(Bäckman et al. 1997). The data that Kemppainen et al. (1993) have shown do not indicate 
that diminishing phase is needed, when relation between pH and yield is estimated.   
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discussion paper: Myyrä, S., Ketoja, E., Yli-Halla, M., and Pietola, K. 2004. Land 
improvements under land tenure insecurity the case of pH and phosphate in Finland. MTT 
Agrifood Research Finland. Discussion papers 2004/3. 
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